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Recent Developments 
Sessoms v. State 
Test for Admitting Other Crimes into Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Does Not 
Apply to Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Committed by Witness who Testifies at Trial 
I n a four to three decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the test for admitting 
evidence of other crimes into criminal 
proceedings does not apply to crimes, 
wrongs, or acts committed by anyone 
other than the defendant. Sessoms v. 
State, 357 Md. 274, 744 A.2d 9 
(2000). The court found that the other 
crimes evidence rule, a court-created 
standard, is intended to protect a 
defendant from being convicted based 
on a reputation or propensity to 
commit crimes. Although the rule 
protects the defendant from undue 
prejudice, the court held that it does 
not exclude acts committed by other 
people. 
On December 24, 1996, Tracy 
Dillon ("Tracy") was walking through 
an alley when a man who was later 
identified as James Sessoms 
("Sessoms") attacked and raped her 
twice at knife point. When her 
attacker released her, Tracy ran 
towards home. En route, she saw her 
brother, Kelly Dillon ("Kelly"), and his 
friend, Antonio Shields ("Shields',), on 
a street comer. Kelly later testified 
that when he saw his sister, she was 
crying and dirty, with leaves in her hair 
and blood on her hands. The three of 
them found Sessoms on a street comer 
and confronted him. Once Kelly 
determined that Sessoms had 
attacked Tracy, he and Shields then 
beat Sessoms nearly unconscious. 
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When Officer Edward Marshall 
("Officer Marshall") arrived at the 
scene, he found Tracy, hysterical, 
standing about fifteen feet from 
Sessoms, who was lying unconscious 
in the street. Kelly and Shields had 
fled the scene. Tracy told Officer 
Marshall that Sessoms had raped her 
and that he had been assaulted by two 
unknown men. A nurse at Mercy 
Hospital found inj uries consistent with 
non-consensual sex; however, no 
semen was found. Tracy admitted to 
the nurse that she knew who had 
attacked Sessoms, but refused to 
reveal their names. 
Officer Francis Shipp ("Officer 
Shipp") drove Tracy home from the 
hospital early in the morning hours of 
December 25, 1996. At that time, 
Tracy identified Kelly as her brother 
to the officer. Minutes later, Tyrone 
Pitman ("Pitman") ran up to the police 
car and told Officer Shipp that he had 
just been robbed by "that man," and 
referred to Kelly. Upon hearing this 
statement, Tracy said, "1 ain't saying 
it is my brother or isn't my brother." 
Sessoms was tried in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City on a seven-
count indictment alleging rape, assault, 
assault with intent to rape, and sexual 
offenses. Sessoms, 357 Md. at 276, 
744 A.2d at 10. The State filed a 
motion in limine to exclude the 
testimony of Officer Shipp alleging 
that Kelly had robbed Pitman. Id. at 
279, 744 A.2d at 12. Defense 
counsel argued that the testimony was 
relevant when considered in light of 
Tracy's inconsistent statements 
concerning her brother's identity and 
Sessoms' claimofarobbery. Id. at 
279-80, 744 A.2d at 12. The trial 
judge granted the State's motion, 
holding that the "highly prejudicial" 
evidence should be excluded. Id. 
At trial, Sessoms testified on his 
own behalf, stating that he did not 
touch Tracy. Id. at 278, 744 A.2d 
at 12. He said that while he was 
walking down Baltimore Street to 
purchase lottery tickets, he was 
approached by two men, one of 
whom accused him of robbing his 
sister. Id. Sessoms denied the 
robbery, and was beaten unconscious 
by the two men. Id. Afterwards, he 
noticed that money and two lottery 
tickets, which had been in his 
possession prior to the attack, were 
missing from his pants pockets. Id. 
The jury convicted Sessoms of 
third-degree sexual offense and 
acquitted him of the remaining 
charges; the court imposed a ten-year 
sentence. Id. at 281, 744 A.2d at 
11. Sessoms appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
which affirmed his conviction in an 
unreported opinion. Id. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted a 
writ of certiorari to determine whether 
the test for admitting other crimes 
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evidence should apply to evidence 
offered not against the defendant, but 
against a witness to establish a 
defense. Id. at 277,744 A.2d at II. 
The court began its analysis by 
noting that the rule prohibiting 
introduction of evidence of other 
crimes was established to protect 
defendants from undue prejudice at 
trial. Id. at 282,744 A.2d at 13 (citing 
Boydv. United States, 142 U.S. 450 
(1892)). The court cited three policy 
reasons for the rule: 
(1) the strong tendency to find 
the accused guilty of the 
charge merely because of his 
or her history of committing 
such acts; (2) the tendency to 
condemn the accused not 
because of guilt, but because 
he or she escaped 
punishment from previous 
offenses; and (3) the injustice 
of unfair surprise. 
Id. at283, 744 A.2d at 14 (citing lA 
John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 
58.2, at 1215). The court emphasized 
that none of these policy 
considerations applied to anyone 
other than the defendant. Id. The 
standard was adopted by Maryland 
in State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 
552 A.2d 896 (1989). Id. at 277, 
744 A.2d at 11. Accordingly, the rule 
was later codified as Maryland Rule 
5-404(b), using language derived 
from Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Id. at 
285, 744 A.2d at 15. 
The court observed that it had 
been afforded many opportunities to 
evaluate the other crimes evidence rule 
and had consistently held that use of 
the test in criminal proceedings was 
limited to acts committed by the 
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defendant. Id. at 283, 744 A.2d at 
14. The court stated that an extension 
of the rule to parties other than the 
defendant would "broaden[] it 
beyond the type of prej udice that this 
rule was designed to prevent." Id. at 
285, 744 A.2d at 15. This 
interpretation of the rule was 
supported by a majority of federal 
court interpretations of Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b). Id. at 287, 744 A.2d at 16. 
The court of appeals adopted the 
majority rule that "when evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
committed by a third party is 
proffered by the defendant, the risks 
of prejudice against the defendant 
normally are not present." Id. at 291, 
744 A.2d at 18. 
On appeal, the State argued that 
since Maryland Rule 5-404(a) 
distinguished the "use of character 
evidence based on whether the 
character at issue is of the accused, 
the victim, or a witness," Rule 5-
404(b), which uses the general word 
"person," indicated that the rule was 
intended to apply to persons other 
than the defendant. Id. at 286, 744 
A.2d at 16. The court rejected this 
argument, noting that in Wynn v. 
State, 351 Md. 307,718 A.2d 588 
(1998), the court interpreted Rule 5-
404(b) along with Maryland case law, 
and held that Rule 5-404(b) only 
excluded evidence of wrongs 
committed by the defendant. !d. at 
286-87, 744 A.2d at 16. The court 
found thatto expand the scope of the 
rule to persons "other than the 
defendant would turn the purpose of 
this rule on its head." Id. at287, 744 
A.2d at 16. The court reasoned that 
evidence of wrongs committed by a 
witness does not impute to the 
defendant a propensity to commit a 
crime.ld. 
The court determined that the 
excluded evidence regarding Pitman's 
alleged robbery by Kelly might have 
been relevant to Sessoms' defense, 
especially when considered in light of 
Tracy's inconsistent statements. Id. 
at 291,744 A.2d at 18-19. The 
court stated that the evidence related 
to Sessoms' defense that he was 
robbed by Kelly, that Tracy had 
concocted the rape to cover for her 
brother, and that the suppression of 
this evidence denied Sessoms an 
opportunity to fully present the basis 
of his defense. Id. at 292, 744 A.2d 
at 19. The court of appeals held that 
exclusion of this evidence on other 
crimes evidence grounds was 
erroneous. Id. The court further 
stated that exclusion of this evidence 
denied Sessoms an opportunity to 
impeach Tracy's credibility by 
introducing her inconsistent 
statements, and to show that Tracy and 
Kelly "had bias, prejudice, interest, or 
other motive to testifY falsely." Id. at 
294, 744 A.2d at 20. 
The dissent, authored by Judge 
Wilner, criticized the majority for 
reaching out to decide an issue that 
was not present in the case. Id. at 
295, 744 A.2d at2I. Hefoundthat 
Pitman's accusation that Kelly had 
robbed him was properly excluded 
because it was hearsay, and highly 
prejudicial. Id. at 296, 744 A.2d at 
21. He agreed with the majority that 
the rule against admitting evidence of 
other crimes should be limited to 
evidence admitted against the 
defendant in a criminal case, but 
stressed that such evidence should not 
"be freely admissible in all other 
circumstances." Id. at 301-02, 744 
A.2d at 24. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's conclusion that the bar 
against admission of evidence of other 
crimes applies only to defendants is 
troublesome from a practical 
standpoint. The limitation of this rule 
opens the door to allowing such 
evidence to be introduced at trial 
against witnesses in criminal 
proceedings, thereby putting those 
individuals on trial. Admission of such 
evidence presents a fact-finder with 
evidence that is irrelevant to the issues 
in the case. As noted by the dissent 
in the instant case, other evidence was 
properly admissible to impeach the 
State's witnesses. Use of evidence 
that someone other than a defendant 
has committed crimes or bad acts 
should be introduced in a criminal trial 
only in very limited circumstances. 
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